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ABSTRACT: Current accounts of the development of scientific 
reasoning focus on individual children’s ability to coordinate the 
collection and evaluation of evidence with the creation of theories 
to explain the evidence. This observational study of parent–child 
interactions in a children’s museum demonstrated that parents shape 
and support children’s scientific thinking in everyday, 
nonobligatory activity. When children engaged an exhibit with 
parents, their exploration of evidence was observed to be longer, 
broader, and more focused on relevant comparisons than children 
who engaged the exhibit without their parents. 
 
Parents were observed to talk to children about how to select and 
encode appropriate evidence and how to make direct comparisons 
between the most informative kinds of evidence. Parents also sometimes 
assumed the role of explainer by casting children’s experience in 
causal terms, connecting the experience to prior knowledge, or 
introducing abstract principles. We discuss these findings with respect 
to two dimensions of children’s scientific thinking: developments in 
evidence collection and developments in theory construction.  
INTRODUCTION 
This study explores the role that parents play in structuring children’s 
everyday scientific reasoning and in facilitating the construction of 
children’s everyday scientific theories. Research on out-of-school 
scientific thinking has often focused on either the processes through 
which children collect evidence and construct theories (Klahr, Fay, & 
Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Laughlin, 1988; Schauble, 
1996) or the content and organization of children’s theories in foundational 
domains such as physics, psychology, and biology (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Although work on these two 
dimensions of scientific thinking provides a detailed picture of what 
individual children can do in the context of laboratory-based psychology 
studies, little is known about spontaneous scientific thinking in everyday 
activity. In particular, current developmental theory is underspecified with 
respect to the role that parents may play in guiding children’s scientific 
reasoning processes and in structuring children’s creation and use of 
theories. In this paper, we address this issue through an analysis of 
spontaneous episodes of scientific thinking that occurred during family 
museum visits. 
One major branch of research into children’s scientific thinking has been 
concerned with scientific reasoning processes. Such studies have sought to 
describe how individual children form hypotheses, collect evidence, make 
inferences, and revise theories. The process of scientific thinking has been 
described as depending on the coordinated search of at least two problem 
spaces: a space of evidence and a space of theories (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). 
These are seen as mutually interactive, so that inferences about evidence can 
modify theories and inferences drawn from theories can influence how 
individuals seek out further evidence. 
Studies of children’s self-directed problem solving suggest that children 
sometimes have difficulty in coordinating the collection of evidence with the 
construction of theories. For example, Schauble (1996) compared adults to 
fifth and sixth graders on a self-directed scientific reasoning task. 
Compared to children, adults explored the evidence more systematically and 
were more likely to make inferences about variables that they had originally 
misunderstood. When children interpreted evidence, they were more likely 
to focus on the effects of variables that they had already understood correctly. 
Similarly, Dunbar and Klahr (1989) found that, compared to adults, children 
generated less informative comparisons and often jumped to incorrect 
conclusions before conducting an exhaustive search of available evidence. 
One of the reasons younger children are thought to have difficulty at 
coordinating evidence and theory is that they often appear to have 
difficulty in separating a potential theory from the evidence that could 
prove or disprove it (Kuhn et al., 1988). The inability to separate the two is 
often thought to result from metacognitive lapses in reflection, and leads 
to situations where children are unable to adjust theories in response to 
evidence. 
The first hypothesis we test in this study is that children’s scientific 
reasoning processes are more advanced when parents and children jointly 
engage in scientific thinking. There is a growing literature concerning the 
ways parents shape children’s problem solving in domains other than 
scientific thinking (see Rogoff,1998 for a review). Wood, Bruner, and Ross 
(1976) first described parents as expert problem solvers who scaffold the 
novice problem solving of children by helping to define the task, 
simplifying subgoal structures, helping to maintain motivation, helping to 
identify appropriate outcomes, regulating frustration, and demonstrating 
expert solutions. Recent work inspired by sociocultural theory enriches the 
earlier scaffolding account by examining parent–child problem solving in 
light of how the mutually constituted activity contributes to the 
development of children’s participation in specific cultural, historical, and 
institutional contexts (e.g., Rogoff, 1990). In this study, we extend this prior 
work to the question of how parent participation impacts children’s every-
day scientific reasoning by comparing the ways that children collect 
evidence when they are collaborating with parents, with peers, or when 
they are engaged in solitary reasoning. 
A second major branch of scientific thinking research has been concerned 
with the content and organization of children’s theories for foundational 
domains such as biology, physics, and psychology. For example, evidence 
suggests young children have developed an elementary understanding that 
biological entities share common defining characteristics that make them 
distinct from physical entities (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Many of these 
“theory–theory” accounts emphasize the role of causal explanations in 
theory development and revision. Carey (1985), for example, argues that 
“explanation is at the core of theories” (p. 201). In most of the discussions 
within the theory approach, explanations are seen as a useful tool for 
assessing the nature of a child’s current theory. Less attention has been 
given to the social context in which explanations are constructed, and to 
the possible role of children’s everyday conversations about scientific 
topics as a setting within which theories are constructed and revised. 
Explanation episodes that arise in everyday conversation present excellent 
opportunities for children to articulate and revise their theories of scientific 
phenomena, with guidance from parents and other adults. 
Thus, the second hypothesis we explore in this study is that parents explain 
science to their children while engaged in everyday scientific reasoning. 
Studies of picture-book reading have shown that parents provide children 
with information about labels and properties of objects, but less 
information about causal processes (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, 
& Pappas, 1998). Explanations and other scientific information seem to be 
more prevalent, however, when parents and children are involved in more 
active settings rather than in the reading and pretend play activities in 
which parent-child conversation has been most often studied. Several 
studies have reported that parents and children engage in meaningful 
explanatory conversations during dinner table conversations, cooking 
projects, and other activities (Callanan & Jipson, 2001; Callanan & Oakes, 
1992; Shrager & Callanan; 1991; Snow & Kurland, 1996). Snow and 
Kurland (1996) examined parent–child conversations while playing with 
magnets and found parents’ discussion of scientific processes was correlated 
with children’s performance on several measures of early literacy. Snow 
and Kurland see scientific explanation as a kind of extended discourse, and 
argue that science talk in the home should prepare children for school 
science discussions. 
MUSEUMS AS LOCATIONS FOR STUDYING 
EVERYDAY SCIENTIFIC THINKING 
To capture everyday scientific thinking, we videotaped family interactions 
at an interactive science exhibit in the Children’s Discovery Museum in San 
Jose, California. Similar to the computer microworlds or contrived laboratory 
tasks that have often been used in previous developmental studies of 
children’s scientific thinking (Klahr, 2000), interactive science exhibits 
provide environments where children can generate evidence, interpret 
evidence, and build theories relevant to particular science or technology 
content. 
Previous museum-learning research suggests that museum visits provide 
a good context for a study of family scientific thinking, as parents and 
children would be expected to engage in practices typical of everyday 
activity, such as agenda and goal negotiation, a mix of individual and social 
problem solving moments, and, importantly, conversation (Borun, Chambers, 
& Cleghorn 1996; Cone & Kendall, 1978; Dierking & Falk, 1994; 
Gelman, Massey, & McManus, 1991). Family conversations in museums 
have been characterized as a mix of specific talk about how to manipulate 
exhibits, describe concrete visible aspects of an exhibit, or to connect the 
museum experience to prior family experiences and memories (Falk & 
Dierking, 2000). Although individual museum exhibits are often not 
designed with a family audience in mind (Crowley & Callanan, 1998), 
families are more likely to collaborate and talk when exhibits have, among 
other features, multiple access points, a multiuser capability, multiple 
possible outcomes, and content that is directly relevant to visitors’ prior 
knowledge and experiences (Borun & Dristas, 1997). 
We focused on scientific thinking at a zoetrope in the Children’s 
Discovery Museum (Figure 1). The zoetrope is a simple animation device 
developed in nineteenth-century Europe (Hayes, 1992), which produces the 
illusion of motion through a stroboscopic effect involving persistence of 
vision (the retina retains an individual image for about one-tenth of a 
second) and the Phi phenomenon (the visual system combines the series of 
successive individual images into a single smooth motion). The stroboscopic 
presentation of individual frames in the zoetrope is enabled by looking 
through the slots ofthe spinning drum. Cartoons, movies, and video ensure 
that the typical child is surrounded by the illusion of motion in everyday 
settings. The zoetrope provides an opportunity to explore how these 
familiar devices work. 
Zoetropes are a common interactive science exhibit at museums around 
the world; this particular zoetrope had an additional uncommon feature. 
Above each frame of an animation of a running horse there was a tab that 
could be raised or lowered by the visitor. A photoelectric switch is 
positioned above the rim of the zoetrope so that when a raised tab breaks 
the beam of light, it triggers the sound of a single hoof beat. Thus, in 
addition to exploring how the illusion of motion is created, children can 
experiment with constructing a “soundtrack” for the animation of the 
running horse.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
What kinds of scientific thinking might occur if children happen to come 
upon a zoetrope during a museum visit? Children may decide to explore the 
illusion of motion. The primary operators of the zoetrope are spinning and 
stopping the drum, and observing through the slots or observing over the 
top. If children happen to look through the slots while the zoetrope is 
spinning, they will observe the illusion of motion. Once they have 
discovered how to produce the illusion of motion, two further aspects of 
the animation can also be explored. First, the direction in which the 
animated horse appears to be running depends on the direction in which 
the zoetrope is spun: Counterclockwise spinning makes the horse appear to 
run forward while clockwise spinning makes the horse appear to run 
backward. Second, the speed of the animation depends on how quickly 
children spin the zoetrope: Slow spinning makes the horse appear to run 
slowly while fast spinning increases the pace. Finally, in addition to exploring 
aspects of the illusion of motion, children might explore the zoetrope’s tabs 
and photoelectric switch. By raising and lowering tabs and then spinning the 
zoetrope, children can create different patterns of sound. This could 
proceed independent of the animation, or it could be an attempt to 
synchronize the sound of hoof beats to the animation of the running horse. 
To address the hypothesis that children’s scientific-reasoning processes 
are more advanced when parents and children jointly engage in scientific 
thinking, we will compare the activity of children who used the zoetrope by 
themselves, in peer groups, or in parent-child groups. This level of analysis 
can be thought of as a baseline for describing the role of parents. Even if 
one takes the extreme position that all of the relevant developments in 
scientific thinking are best described as taking place solely within the mind 
of an individual child, it is relevant to have a description of the kinds of 
evidence children encounter and whether that evidence varies depending 
on the social context of activity. 
Our second hypothesis was that parent conversation would support 
children’s everyday scientific thinking. Thus, our second level of analysis 
describes how families talked about the evidence they encountered, 
including how children and adults suggested directions for exploration, 
described evidence, and explained. This level goes beyond the description 
of the evidence children encounter to a description of how collaborative 
activity may shape the way children encode, evaluate, and explain evidence 




Participants were 91 families with children between 4- and 8-years old who 
visited the Children’s Discovery Museum in San Jose, California. Coding 
and analysis focused around the experience of one target children from 
each of these families. Our selection procedure for target children 
(described later) yielded a sample of 58 boys and 33 girls. 
Data Collection 
Data were collected on four separate days. A video camera was set up 
near the zoetrope and a wireless microphone was unobtrusively attached to 
the back ofthe exhibit. Researchers greeted families entering the museum, 
explained that they were videotaping as part of a research project, and 
asked families for written consent to participate. Consent rates were 
greater than 90% on each day of data collection. Children in consenting 
families wore large stickers identifying them as participants. This was the 
only point at which researchers interacted with visitors. 
If a child wearing a sticker chose to engage the zoetrope during the 
natural course of his or her visit, the camera operator turned on the camera 
for the length of the engagement. Because the zoetrope is located in a room 
on the far side from the entrance of the museum, children typically do not 
encounter it until they have engaged many other exhibits. Thus, the initial 
rush of frenetic activity that is common when children first enter a 
children’s museum had passed before children in this study engaged the 
zoetrope. 
Data Reduction 
Videotapes were segmented into nonoverlapping interactions. Even if 
families stay together as a group while visiting exhibits, each person does 
not necessarily arrive at a new exhibit at exactly the same time. For 
example, children sometimes run ahead to engage the next exhibit while 
parents and perhaps siblings linger behind at the previous one. Interactions 
were defined as beginning when the first child from a family—the target 
child—approached the zoetrope and are defined as ending when he or she 
left the zoetrope. The next target child was defined as the first child from a 
new family who engaged the zoetrope after all members of the previous 
target child’s family had left. If children returned later to the zoetrope for 
a second engagement, they were not designated targets. Thus, each 
interaction analyzed in this study was a unique slice of time representing 
the complete engagement of a unique target child from a unique family. 
The way in which children engaged the zoetrope determined whether 
they were in the adult–child, peer, or solitary group. The adult–child group 
was composed ofthe 49 families where children and parents were together 
as they engaged. The peer group was 22 families where two or more children 
engaged while parents were occupied elsewhere in the museum. Finally, in 
the solitary group, 20 children engaged by themselves while all other 
family members were occupied elsewhere in the museum. 
The verbalizations and actions of all participants in each interaction 
were transcribed, with each transcript checked and verified by a second 
independent transcriber. Coding was conducted with both videotapes and 
transcripts. Reliability for each coding scheme was determined separately 
by comparing the codes of a primary coder with those of a second 
independent coder who processed at least 20% of the data. We report 
interrater agreement separately for each group of codes. 
Target Children’s Exposure to Evidence 
General Measures of Engagement. In order to provide a broad 
comparison between the engagement of children in the parent–child, peer, 
and solitary groups, we computed the length of each target child’s 
engagement and whether each target child has used each of the four basic 
operators afforded by the zoetrope. Spinning was coded if target children 
changed the state of rotation at least once by either spinning the zoetrope 
or stopping the zoetrope from spinning. Observing through slots was coded 
if target children looked for at least 2 seconds through the slots at least 
once. We adopted the 2-s threshold to ensure that children actually intended 
to look through the slots, as opposed to having simply passed their gaze 
past the slots while shifting their attention elsewhere. Observing over the 
top was coded if target children performed a 2-s gaze down into the 
cylinder of the zoetrope. Using tabs was coded if target children raised or 
lowered a tab at least once. Interrater agreement was 95%. 
Perceiving the Illusion of Motion. Perceiving the illusion of motion 
depends on whether the zoetrope is spinning or not and on whether the 
viewer is looking at the frames of animation through the slots or over the 
top of the zoetrope. As described in Figure 2, the factorial combination of 
rotation state and observational vantage point defines four unique categories 
of evidence about the illusion of motion. 
Each engagement was divided into 10-s segments and, for each segment, 
coders judged whether target children had visited each cell in the evidence 
space for at least 2 s. SlotSpin was coded if children looked at the 
animation through the slots of a spinning zoetrope, revealing the illusion of 
motion. TopSpin was coded when children looked down at the animation 
from over the top of the spinning zoetrope, revealing a spinning, but 
unanimated, sequence of frames. SlotStop was coded when children looked 
at the animation through the slots of a stopped zoetrope, revealing a single 
still frame. TopStop was coded when children looked down at the animation 
from over the top of a stopped zoetrope, revealing a sequence of still 
frames. Interrater agreement was 91%. 
Changing the Speed of Animation. The speed of the animation 
depends on how quickly children spin the zoetrope: Slow spinning makes 
the horse appear to run slowly, faster spinning increases the pace. By 
coding differences in how the spinning zoetrope appeared on the 
videotapes, we determined whether children observed the animation 
through the slots for at least two continuous seconds while spinning was 
slow, medium, or fast. With slow spinning (about 40 rpm), the animation 
appears on the videotape to be in slow motion and individual slots and tabs 
can be clearly perceived. With medium spinning (about 70 rpm), the horse 
appears to be running at a normal speed, and the slots appear as static 
rectangular flashes (i.e., individual slots can no longer be distinguished as 
they rotate past). Individual tabs are still clearly distinguishable. With fast 
spinning (about 100 rpm), the animation becomes noticeably brighter and 
individual tabs can no longer be distinguished. A series of dark bands 
(caused by an interaction between the speeds of the rotating slots and the 
video camera shutter) appears to move smoothly across the animation in the 
opposite direction of the zoetrope’s motion. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Coding was conducted from videotapes with the sound turned off to 
ensure that any talk about speed of spinning or the patterns of sounds 
generated by raised tabs passing through the photoelectric switch did not 
influence coding judgements. Interrater agreement was 88%. 
Reversing the Direction of Animation. The direction in which the 
animated horse appears to be running depends on the direction in 
which the zoetrope is spun: Counter-clockwise spinning makes the 
horse appear to run normally; clockwise spinning makes the horse appear 
to run in reverse. Coders judged whether the target child looked at the 
animation through the slots for at least two continuous seconds while the 
zoetrope was spinning in each direction. Interrater agreement was 100%. 
Changing Patterns of Sound. If participants raised or lowered the tabs 
and then spun the zoetrope, they could hear different patterns of sound. 
Coders listened to the patterns of sound experienced by each target child 
and judged whether they heard one pattern or more than one. Interrater 
agreement was 92%. 
Conversations and Parent Guidance 
Using both transcripts and videotapes, we coded four kinds of talk for 
each participant in parent–child and peer groups. Target children who 




Describing evidence was defined as talk about the evidence that could be 
observed at the zoetrope that did not establish any causal, analogical, or 
principled connections between what could be seen and how or why it 
could be seen. Each utterance by each participant was coded for whether 
he or she had described evidence. Interrater agreement was 93%. 
In addition, because we were interested specifically in parent guidance, 
parent activity was coded on a larger grain size for how descriptions of 
evidence functioned to shape children’s scientific thinking. By examining 
                                                            
1 It was logically possible that children alone may have talked to themselves, and, 
indeed, talk was coded in 15% of the solitary groups. In these cases, talk was always about 
observation (e.g., saying “Cool!” following the first successful perception of the illusion 
of motion). 
 
the activity and conversation throughout the whole interaction, coders 
judged whether parents had used talk to (1) highlight a single kind of 
relevant evidence; and/or (2) suggest the correct encoding of evidence. 
Examples of these are presented later in the results section. Interrater 
agreement was 85%. 
Giving directions was defined as talk about how to manipulate the 
zoetrope, such as, “Spin it this way,” “You have to look through these 
slots,” or “Let’s raise these tabs.” To be coded in this category, an 
utterance must have explicitly referred to one of the four operators. Each 
utterance by each participant was coded for whether he or she had given 
directions. Interrater agreement was 88%. 
We also applied codes of a larger grain size to identify the extent to which 
parents guided children’s exploration by giving directions. By examining the 
activity and conversation throughout the whole interaction, coders judged 
whether parents had used talk to (1) tell children how to generate a single 
kind of evidence; and/or (2) suggest direct comparisons between different 
kinds of evidences. Examples are presented later in the results section. 
Interrater agreement was 90%. 
Explanation was defined as talk about causal relations, analogies, or 
general statements of the scientific principles underlying the exhibit. 
Causal explanations included talk about causal links within the local context 
of the exhibit such as “The horse looks like it’s running backwards because 
you spun this thing the wrong way.” Analogies included talk that made a 
connection between the exhibit and prior knowledge or prior experience such 
as “This is how cartoons work.” Principles included talk about 
unobservable causal principles underlying, for example, the illusion of 
motion, “Your mind, your eye, put together each of these little pictures and 
that’s why it looks like it’s moving.” Interrater agreement was 87%. 
Other was used for utterances that could not be assigned to the three 
utterance-level codes as described earlier. We included this category in order 
to account for all talk in the interaction and thus be able to provide some 
context for the overall frequencies for the other three categories of talk. 
Among the kinds of talk coded as “other” were statements about turn-taking, 
safety, and talk unrelated to using the zoetrope such as needing to eat or 
visit the bathroom. 
RESULTS 
Results are presented in three parts. First, we compare the evidence 
encountered by target children in adult–child, peer, or solitary groups. 
Second, we compare general measures of talk from the utterance-level 
coding of adult–child and peer groups, describing how parents talked about 
evidence, encouraged children to explore, and explained. Because 
preliminary analyses revealed no systematic gender differences, findings are 
presented collapsed across gender. 
The Evidence Children Encountered 
General Measures of Engagement. Table 1 summarizes general measures 
ofchildren’s engagement with the zoetrope. Children who engaged the 
zoetrope with their parents spent significantly more time at the exhibit than 
children who engaged by themselves or in peer groups, F(2, 88) = 12.77, p 
< 0.0001 .
2
 Follow-up comparisons showed significant differences 
between the adult-child group and the solitary (p < 0.0001) and peer 
groups (p < 0.001), which were not significantly different from one 
another. The overall mean (62 s) and standard deviation (54 s) for 
engagement time are consistent with other studies of interactive science 
exhibits (Borun et al., 1996; Paris, Troop, Henderlong, & Sulfaro, 1994) 
and suggest that the particular zoetrope we studied is not atypical among 
interactive science exhibits. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Although children in adult–child groups spent significantly more 
time at the exhibit, they were not significantly more likely than other 
children to have tried out any of the four basic operators. In fact, members 
of the group that engaged the zoetrope for the shortest time, children by 
                                                            
2 To compare continuous dependent measures, we used analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with follow-up (Fisher PLSD) comparisons. The ANOVAs determined whether there was a 
reliable main effect for whether children used the zoetrope as part of a adult–child, peer, or 
solitary group. The follow-up analyses identified which of the pair-wise comparisons 
between these three groups was statistically significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. For 
discreet dependent measures, Chi-squares were used to determine whether the overall 
effect for group was significant. 
 
themselves, were most likely to have spun it at least once, followed by 
children with adults and in peer groups, X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 6.4, p < 
0.05. There were no significant differences in use of the other three operators. 
A little over half of the children looked over the top at least once, regardless 
of whether they were with parents, peers, or by themselves, X
2
 (df = 2, n = 
91) = 0. 18, n.s. Children with adults were somewhat more likely to look 
through the slots, followed by children in peer groups and alone, but the 
difference was only marginally significant, X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 5.4, p < 
0.07. Finally, less than half of the children manipulated tabs at least once, 
regardless of whether they were with parents, with peers, or by themselves, 
X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 1.7, n.s. 
Exploring the Illusion of Motion. To perceive the illusion of motion 
from the zoetrope, it is necessary to spin the zoetrope and observe the 
animation frames through the slots on the drum. To what extent did target 
children encounter the four categories of evidence— SlotSpin, TopSpin, 
SlotStop, TopStop—that could support such an inference (Figure 3a)? Each 
category of evidence was analyzed with one-way ANOVAs and planned 
Fisher PLSD comparisons between adult–child, peer, and solitary groups. 
Children who used the zoetrope with their parents encountered evidence 
from each of these categories more often than children in peer groups or 
children alone (Figure 3b). For each category of evidence, the adult–child 
group was significantly higher than the peer and solitary groups, which 
were never significantly different from each other. For SlotSpin evidence, 
the main effect was significant, F(2, 88) = 8.45, p < 0.001, with the 
parent– child group significantly higher than the peer group, p< 0.01, and 
alone group, p< 0.001. For SlotStop evidence main effect was significant, 
F(2, 88) = 4.06, p < 0.05, with the parent–child group significantly higher 
than the peer group, p< 0.05, and alone group, p< 0.05. Similarly, for 
TopStop evidence the main effect was significant, F(2, 88) = 6.67, p < 
0.01, with the parent–child group significantly higher than the peer group, 
p < 0.01, and alone group, p < 0.01. Finally, the ANOVA for TopSpin 
evidence also showed a significant main effect, F(2, 88) = 4.88, p < 0.01, 
with the parent–child group significantly higher than the peer group, p < 
0.05, and alone group, p < 0.01. 
The factorial evidence space (Figure 3a) specifies six “experiments” 
children could have conducted while using the zoetrope. For example, 
consider a child who looks through the slots of a spinning zoetrope to 
perceive the illusion of motion (SlotSpin), and then, with the zoetrope 
still spinning, looks over the top and perceives a spinning series of 
nonanimated frames (TopSpin). This is a controlled comparison with one 
variable (observation vantage point) manipulated and one variable 
(spinning) held constant. Comparing the two outcomes provides evidence 
to support the inference that looking through the slots is necessary to 
perceive the illusion of motion. We defined children as having conducted 
an experiment if they collected the relevant pair of observations within 
the same 10-s segment. 
Figure 3c shows the mean number of paired comparisons performed by 
children in each group. As we report later, all significant differences involved 
the adult–child group showing higher performance than the peer and/or 
solitary groups, which were never significantly different from each other. 
As suggested at the left of Figure 3c, children with adults were 
significantly more likely than other children to compare the condition 
where the zoetrope produces the illusion of motion (SlotSpin) to the three 
conditions where it does not (TopSpin, SlotStop, and TopStop). There 
was a significant main effect for group on SlotSpin vs. TopSpin 
comparisons, F(2, 88) = 6.68, p < 0.01, with the adult–child group 
significantly higher than the peer group p < 0.01, and solitary group, p < 
0.01. For SlotSpin vs. SlotStop comparisons, there was a significant main 
effect, F(2, 88) = 3.49, p = 0.05, with the adult– child group 
significantly higher than the peer group, p < 0.05, and the solitary 
group, p < 0.05. Finally, for SlotSpin vs. TopStop comparisons there was 
also a main effect for group, F(2, 88) = 5.29, p < 0.01, with the adult–
child group significantly higher than the peer group, p < 0.01, and the 
solitary group, p < 0.05.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
The other three paired comparisons do not involve SlotSpin evidence, and 
thus do not involve the illusion ofmotion (right ofFigure 3c). Although 
children with adults still exhibited the highest mean numbers of 
comparisons, main effects for group were only significant for SlotStop vs. 
TopStop comparisons, with a main effect of F(2, 88) = 6.01, p < 0.01, 
and the adult–child group significantly higher than children in peer groups, 
p< 0.05, or solitary groups, p < 0.01. Main effects were not significant 
for the other two kinds comparisons: TopSpin vs. SlotStop, F(2, 88) = 
2.05, n.s., and TopSpin vs. TopStop, F(2, 88) = 2.6, n.s. 
Thus, compared to children with peers or children alone, children with their 
parents were exposed more often to the four kinds of evidence and they 
were more likely to conduct paired comparisons of the conditions under 
which the zoetrope does and does not produce the illusion of motion. The 
finding that the pattern of differences were not as pronounced for 
comparisons that do not involve the illusion of motion suggests that the 
presence of parents was not just associated with an increase in any of the 
possible comparisons. Instead, children with parents focused more 
frequently on the most informative group of comparisons. 
Changing Speed and Direction of Animation. Once children 
understand how to create the illusion of motion with the zoetrope, there 
are two further aspects of the illusion that can be directly explored: the 
relation between the direction of spin and the direction in which the horse 
appears to run, and the relation between spin rate and the speed with which 
the horse appears to run. 
To explore the relation between direction of spin and direction of 
animation, children would need to have observed the animation through the 
slots at least once when the zoetrope was spinning clockwise and once 
when it was spinning counterclockwise. Target children in adult–child 
groups (37%) were somewhat more likely to have observed both pieces of 
evidence at least once, followed by children in solitary groups (25%), and 
in peer groups (9%), X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 6.17, p = 0.05. 
To explore the relation between rate of spin and speed of animation, 
children would need to have observed the animation through the slots when 
the zoetrope was spinning at two different speeds. Children were equally 
likely to have observed at least two different speeds of animation, 
regardless of whether they were in the adult–child group (33%), peer group 
(36%), or solitary group (30%), X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 0.20, n.s. 
Changing Patterns of Sound. By raising and lowering tabs and then 
spinning the zoetrope, children could make the zoetrope generate different 
patterns of sound. As noted in earlier analyses, raising or lower tabs was 
the least explored of the four possible operators, with less than half of 
children from each group manipulating the tabs. However, target children 
would have encountered evidence that the tabs could be used to make 
different patterns of sound regardless of whether they themselves had raised 
the tabs or whether tabs were raised by other people using the zoetrope with 
them. A broader analysis measured the number of different sound patterns 
that children heard during engagement, either because they or another 
person had manipulated tabs and then spun the zoetrope. Children in parent– 
child groups were the most likely to hear more than one pattern of sound 
(49%) followed by children in peer groups (41%) and children alone 
(10%), X
2
 (df = 2, n = 91) = 9.19, p = 0.01. 
Raising the tabs to make different patterns of sound could occur 
independently of the animation, or it could have occurred in the context of 
families trying to synchronize the patterns of sound to the animation of the 
running horse. To look for evidence of synchronization, coders went back 
to examine segments where families raised or lowered at least one tab and 
judged the family as having engaged in synchronization if they talked about 
synchronization or showed any evidence of synchronization in manipulation 
patterns. Only two interactions (one parent–child and one peer) contained 
any evidence of synchronization. In both of these cases participants 




Comparing General Characteristics of Talk between Adult--
Child and Peer groups 
While engaged with the zoetrope, target children in adult–child groups 
(92%) were more likely to be involved in talk—defined as generating 
talk, hearing talk, or both— than target children in peer groups (73%), X2 
(1) = 4.58, p < 0.05. Furthermore, talk in parent–child groups was more 
likely to be mutual than talk in peer groups. Of the 92% of parent–child 
interactions involving talk, 92% involved both parents and target children 
generating some of the talk. In contrast, among the 73% of peer 
interactions that included talk, only 44% involved both target children and 
other children generating some of the talk, X
2
(1) = 6.37, p < 0.05. Thus, the 
majority of cases where talk occurred in peer group interactions were 
characterized by one child speaking and the other not responding. 
                                                            
3  It is not surprising that children were unsuccessful at achieving synchronization as it 
is quite subtle. With their permission, we recorded two adults without children spend 
almost 10 min engaged in discussion and experimentation trying to synchronize sounds and 
animation. It was difficult even for the adults. They followed the sensible strategy of 
raising tabs above each frame where a hoof was depicted as hitting the ground. However, 
this strategy only works when one observes the animation directly across the cylinder 
from the photoelectric switch, because each sound of a hoof beat is then generated at the 
moment when the animation shows the hoofs falling. Observing from another spot puts 
the animation and the soundtrack out of synchronization. The adults did not realize this at 
first, 2 most of the 10 min trying to figure out why their initial strategy did not work.
 
 
As shown in Figure 4, adults were more likely than children to engage in 
each of the four kinds oftalk coded. Because there could have been multiple 
adults and children in each interaction, the data in Figure 4 are adjusted to show 
the mean speech act per adult or child in each interaction. First, consider 
adults and children who visited the zoetrope together. Although the finding 
that adults were more likely to talk about how to manipulate the zoetrope 
was marginally significant, t(48) = 1.84, p = 0.07, adults were significantly 
more likely than children to describe evidence, t(48) = 3.317, p < 0.01, 
offer explanations for the zoetrope, t(48) = 3.53, p < 0.001, and engage in 
other types of talk, t(48) = 2.24, p < 0.05. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Now consider how the context of interacting with adults vs. peers affected 
the nature and amount of children’s talk. Figure 4 shows that children in 
adult–child interactions were no more likely than children in peer groups 
to talk about how to manipulate the zoetrope, t(69) = 0.01, n.s., marginally 
more likely to describe evidence, t(69) = 1.7, p = 0.08, no more likely to 
explain, t(69) = 0.79, n.s., and significantly more likely to engage in other 
types of talk, t(69) = 2.44, p < 0.05. 
Thus, parent–child groups contained the most talk and parents were 
primarily responsible for carrying the talk. We turn now from general 
measures of talk to the functional coding of how parent talk framed 
children’s interpretation of evidence, guided children’s exploration, and 
suggested explanatory links. 
How Parents Supported Children’s Scientific Thinking 
Parents Helped Children Select and Encode Relevant Evidence. One 
of the difficulties children face in everyday scientific thinking is to decide 
which parts of the ongoing rush of experience are relevant evidence and 
which are not. In 47% of interactions, parents highlighted evidence by 
labeling the relevant effect on which children should focus. This most 
often took the form of brief “play-by-play” commentary or questions 
layered on top of the ongoing action. For example, parents often made 
statements such as “It looks like the horse is running” or asked questions 
such as “Hear that galloping sound?” 
In 29% of interactions, parents went beyond focusing children on relevant 
evidence to engaging children in discussions about the appropriate 
encoding of the evidence. Consider the following example of a girl and 
mother. As the videotape segment begins, we see the zoetrope already 
spinning very quickly in a counterclockwise direction. The previous visitor 
had spun it hard and then immediately walked away. The target child 
approaches and kneels to look through the slots. Because the zoetrope is 
turning counterclockwise, the horse appears to be running forward. Within 
1 s her mother appears and looks over the top of the zoetrope before 
bending down to look through the slots. After about 10 s, the girl stands 
and grabs the zoetrope to stop it. 
Parent: “Now make it go this way [gestures as if spinning the 
zoetrope clockwise] and see what happens.” 
Child and P spin zoetrope clockwise together and then 
look through the slots.  
C: “It’s the same.” 
The girl makes an error. The zoetrope is now spinning clockwise and 
the horse appears to be running backwards. However, accurately judging 
the direction of running turned out to be difficult for children and sometimes 
even for adults. The animation of the horse running backwards at first 
appears a little unusual, but it is not immediately obvious why until one 
looks closely at the legs. The mother encourages the girl to explore further. 
P: “Is it running the same way?” 
C stops the zoetrope, pushes it in the opposite [counterclockwise] 
direction, and looks through the slot. 
 
P sits down on the floor next to C. 
C stops zoetrope and stands to look over the top at the still 
frames of animation. C: “Oh it’s facing that way [points to 
her right]. That’s why.” 
P: “So if you turn it this way [counterclockwise gesture] which way 
is it running?” 
C spins zoetrope slowly counterclockwise while looking over 
the top at the animation. She points to her right, which, given the 
orientation of the animated horse, corresponds to running forward. 
She then spins the zoetrope slowly in the opposite direction 
[clockwise] while still looking over the top. 
C: “It’s still going that way!” and points to her right. 
C gets back down on her knees, looks through the slots, and 
spins counterclockwise. P: “Now which way’s it running, 
forward or backward?” 
C points again to her right. 
C: “That’s forwards.” 
P: “Yep.” 
C stops zoetrope. 
P: “Turn it the other way.” 
C turns the zoetrope in the opposite direction [clockwise]. 
C: “It’s going that way.” [points again to the right] 
P: “Is it? (pause) Is it? (pause) Look at the way its legs are going.” 
C: “Ohhh! (excitedly) It’s going back, back, backwards!” 
Before the mother’s finally encouraged the girl to encode how the legs 
moved, the girl appeared to steadfastly resist the notion that changes in 
direction of spin were associated with changes in direction of running. 
This was despite the fact that girl herself had earlier offered a potential 
reason why the direction of running might change with direction spin 
when she said: “Oh it’s facing that way [points to her right]. That’s why.” 
Without the mother’s repeated challenges, the girl may never have 
noticed that she incorrectly encoded a key piece of evidence. 
Parents Helped Children Generate Evidence. We considered parent 
guidance on two levels: pointing children to one part of the evidence 
space and suggesting comparisons between at least two different parts of 
the evidence space. The most basic form of parent guidance was pointing 
children to one part of the evidence space by directly instructing them to 
use one of the four operators without embedding the suggestions in a 
specific comparison. For example, a target boy and his mother 
approached the zoetrope together while an older sister lingered at a nearby 
exhibit. The mother crouched down and put her hands on the zoetrope, 
preparing to spin it. 
Parent: “I want to show you something. Are you ready to go?” 
Child: “Yeah.” 
P: “Look, put your head down here [points to slots] and look 
through the holes. Ready?” C crouches down. 
Sister approaches and crouches down by C. 
C leans forward, peering through the slots, until his nose is 
almost touching the zoetrope. P: “Don’t get your face that close!” 
[while gently guiding B’s head back] 
P: “Ready?” 
C: “Uh huh.” 
P spins the zoetrope counterclockwise. 
C and P watch through the slots. 
Parents provided such basic guidance in 49% of interactions. As in this 
example, parents were most likely to tell children to look through the slots 
(39% of all parent–child interactions); followed by using the tabs (22%), 
and spinning the zoetrope (14%). We did not code a single instance of 
parents directly telling children to look over the top of the zoetrope.
4
 
In 33% of interactions, parents went beyond pointing children to a single 
location in the evidence space to suggest a comparison between two kinds of 
evidence. An instance of this can be seen in the earlier example of the 
mother and girl exploring the direction of motion. As is suggested by the 
first line of the transcript, the girl’s struggle with encoding evidence may 
have never occurred without the mother’s initial suggestion that they spin 
the zoetrope the other way to “see what happens.” Suggesting 
comparisons related to the direction of spin was most common (20% of 
parent–child interactions), followed by comparing sound patterns created by 
different tab configurations (10%), comparing the animation when seen 
through the slots vs. over the top (8%), and comparing how fast the horse 
appeared to be running when the zoetrope was spun at different speeds 
(2%). 
Parents sometimes provided basic guidance and suggested comparisons 
in the same interaction. Overall, 57% of parent–child interactions included 
at least one instance where parents guided children’s exploration of the 
evidence space. 
                                                            
4 Here and elsewhere the sum of the breakdowns of specific kinds of talk can be greater 
than the overall percentage because parents could be coded as engaging in more than one 
specific kind of talk per interaction. 
 
Parents Explained. In 37% of interactions, parents provided an explanation, 
either causal, analogical, or principled. Explanations of local causal 
connections within the exhibit were most common, appearing in 31 % of 
parent–child interactions. 
Parent: “See you can make it gallop like this.” 
P starts putting up all the tabs. 
P: “Because every time it goes through there [points to photoelectric 
switch] it pops, see?”  
P rotates the zoetrope slowly so that one tab triggers the switch. 
Child begins raising tabs. 
The next most common form of explanation (25% of interactions) was 
suggesting analogical connections between the zoetrope and related 
devices. The analogies were typically brief links made between the 
zoetrope and movies, television, or, as in the following example, cartoons: 
Child is crouched down looking through slots of 
spinning zoetrope. Parent crouches down next to B 
to look through slots. 
P spins zoetrope again. 
C: “Ohhhhh ... ” 
P: “Like, uh, that’s how they make cartoons.” 
Finally, in 4% of interactions, parents introduced unobservable principles 
responsible for the illusion of motion. For example, a boy had been spinning 
and looking through the slots when his mother approached, helped to spin the 
zoetrope again, and then bent down to look through the slots. The boy looks 
up. 
Child: “Mama, it looks like it’s 
moving for real.” Parent: “Yeah.” 
P spins the zoetrope again. 
C looks again through the slots. 
C grabs zoetrope to stop it. 
C: “Why’s it look like that?” 
P: (pause) “Because your mind... your eye... sees each little 
picture and each one’s different from the other one [points to the 
animation frames], but your mind puts it all in a big row.” 
C: “It starts out like that [points to animation frames] and 
then it goes and goes.” C spins zoetrope and crouches down 
once more to look through the slots. 
Note from this example that the mother explained because the boy asked 
why. To test whether parent explanations were in general prompted by 
children’s questions, we examined the 10-s leading up to each parent 
explanation to see whether children had asked a question or stated that they 
did not understand something about the zoetrope. This analysis revealed 
that explanations in response to questions were rare, accounting for only 
11% of parent explanations. We also adopted a more liberal criterion of 
considering explanations to be requested if, at any point in the interaction 
prior to the first explanation, children asked any type of question on any 
topic. As expected, the liberal criterion increased the percentage of adult 
explanations following children’s questions, but only to 29%. Thus, most 
parent explanations appeared to be the result of the parent deciding to 
introduce an explanation on top of the ongoing activity. 
DISCUSSION 
This study was designed to provide a window into the everyday scientific 
thinking that occurs in parent–child interactions. Findings suggested that 
children engaged in shared scientific thinking with their parents had greater 
opportunity to learn than children engaged in scientific thinking with peers 
or by themselves. First, when engaging the exhibit with their parents, 
children’s exploration of evidence was observed to be longer, broader, and 
more focussed on relevant comparisons than children who engaged the 
exhibit without their parents. Second, parents talked to children about 
identifying, generating, and interpreting evidence. Specifically, parents 
helped children select and encode relevant evidence in about half of the 
parent–child interactions. The majority of interactions included parent 
talk about how to generate new kinds of evidence or make direct 
comparisons between different kinds of evidence. Finally, in over one-third 
of interactions, parents assumed the role of explainer by casting children’s 
experience in causal terms, connecting the experience to prior knowledge, 
or introducing abstract principles. 
We begin by discussing these findings with respect to what they suggest 
for the two dimensions of children’s scientific thinking that have dominated 
recent developmental studies: developments in evidence collection and 
developments in theory construction. First, consider the implications of 
these findings with respect to the question of how children develop 
strategies for collecting and interpreting evidence. Compared to adults, 
children’s evidence collection is often described as being less systematic, 
less likely to include informative comparisons, and less likely to be 
exhaustive (e.g., Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988; Schauble, 
1996). Developments in evidence collection have typically been 
described as metacognitive advancements that enable children to deploy 
increasingly sophisticated experimentation strategies, to construct more 
accurate and complete encoding of incoming evidence, and to search for 
evidence that is inconsistent with their existing beliefs. The current 
findings suggest that parents may provide extensive support for each of 
these developments in everyday settings. The findings replicate those of 
Gleason & Schauble (2000), where an experimenter asked parents and fifth 
or sixth grade children to work together on a 45-min design task. We 
extend Gleason and Schauble’s findings by showing that parents provide 
appropriate support for the evidence collection of younger children when 
families are engaged in spontaneous, rather than obligatory, collaboration. 
Second, consider the implications of the current findings for 
children’s construction of theories. Those who have focused on the 
content of children’s developing scientific knowledge have in large part 
been interested in ontological organization and constraints, in part to 
account for the fact that even young children have surprising rich 
theories and are able to make adaptive decisions about assigning novel 
instances to appropriate categories (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Our 
findings suggest that children do not always have to solve this 
categorization problem in isolation. The current findings suggest that 
parents sometimes provide constraints for theory building by highlighting 
the most relevant kinds of evidences from all possible evidences. These 
findings are consistent with prior work showing that parents sometimes 
provide guidance to children that is sufficient to provide useful constraints 
for the child’s construction of explanations (Callanan, Shrager, & Moore, 
1996; Gelman, et al., 1998; Shrager & Callanan, 1991). Even if one 
accepts the position that the development of children’s theories is best 
described as a process that takes place “within the head” of the individual 
child, these findings suggest that parents may at least play a role in 
filtering and focusing the evidence that children notice and remember. 
However, our findings also suggest that parents frequently went beyond 
constraining evidence to directly offering explanations that explicate 
causal structure, suggest analogical links, and describe general 
unobservable principles. Thus, much of the knowledge necessary to 
constrain children’s theory construction may be available from 
spontaneous parent assistance. We have coined the term explanatoids to 
describe the kinds of brief, sketchy, and somewhat mundane explanations 
that parents introduce into everyday collaborative exploration. In contrast to 
the more elaborate and complete explanatory conversations that can occur 
in more reflective moments of everyday activity (e.g., Callanan & Oakes, 
1992), explanatoids are brief explanatory prompts thrown into ongoing 
collaborative exploration or problem solving strategy. They are not sufficient 
to teach complete concepts or strategies. Instead, we think of them as “just-
in-time” explanatory nuggets that are offered when relevant evidence is the 
focus of joint parent–child attention and that serve the function of 
providing children an on-line structure for parsing, storing, and making 
inferences about evidence as it is encountered (Crowley & Galco, 2001). 
Is there evidence to suggest that this kind of parent explanation during 
collaborative parent–child activity makes a difference in terms of children’s 
learning? The observational methods used by our study were designed to 
sample spontaneous moments of parent–child thinking and cannot provide 
direct evidence about the extent of children’s learning. However, recent 
laboratory studies suggest that adult explanations can facilitate both 
children’s problem solving and theory construction. When adults explain as 
they demonstrate new problem solving strategies, children are better able to 
transfer strategies to novel problems (Crowley & Siegler, 1999). When 
adults provide causal explanations as children construct family-resemblance 
categories from novel instances, children are more accurate in categorizing 
subsequent instances (Krascum & Andrews, 1998). There are also studies 
to suggest that if adults do not provide such explanations or at least prompt 
the child to produce their own explanation, it is unlikely that children will 
decide to do so on their own (Goncu & Rogoff, 1998; Siegler, 1995). Thus, 
available evidence from laboratory studies supports the possibility that the 
spontaneous parent explanation we observed could facilitate children’s 
learning. 
Before closing, we should note two limitations of the current study. First, 
as with any cognitive task, much of the variance we observed in 
exploration and conversation is likely to be attributed to the design and 
implementation of the particular exhibit we observed. We chose the 
zoetrope exhibit in part because it was consistent with exhibit principles 
that support family collaboration (Borun & Dristas, 1997; Crowley & 
Callanan, 1998) and in part because it characterized features of open-
ended tasks that are often used in psychological research on scientific 
thinking (Klahr 2000). However, different tasks under different conditions 
would likely affect some of the patterns of our findings. Second, while the 
methodology of this study provides a high-resolution snapshot of a moment 
of family activity, it does not provide a broader look at how that moment fits 
into the overall museum visit or a deeper look at how that moment fits into 
the ongoing development of children’s scientific literacy across contexts and 
time. The findings of this study are best seen as a single empirical step toward 
the larger goal of constructing a complete account of the development of 
scientific literacy that integrates what we know about scientific thinking from a 
cognitive perspective and what we know from studies of out-of-school 
learning contexts (e.g., Falk & Dierking, 2000). 
Although we have so far emphasized family visits to a museum as an 
example of a broader class of parent–child activity, we are deeply interested 
in the museum itself as a location for family science education. Converging 
evidence from studies of scientific thinking in everyday, instructional, and 
professional settings describe a developmental corridor that stretches from 
everyday learning in contexts such as museums, through formal science 
instruction in classrooms, to the daily activities of practicing scientists 
(Crowley, Schunn, & Okada, 2001). The current findings serve as a 
reminder that parents provide guidance, coaching, and encouragement as 
children move through this corridor. Parents who involve children in 
informal science activities provide an opportunity for children to learn factual 
scientific information and to practice scientific reasoning, but they also 
provide an opportunity for children to participate in a culture of learning 
about science. In terms of future classroom success or later choices about 
science as a career, the most important outcome of everyday parent–child 
scientific thinking may be that children develop an early interest in 
science, value science as a cultural practice, and form an identity as 
someone who is competent in science. 
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Figure 1. This study focused on families who used the zoetrope while 
visiting the San Jose Children’s Discovery Museum. Visitors who spin the 
zoetrope and look through the slots see an animation of a running horse. 
Above each frame of animation is a tab that can be raised or lowered. When a 
raised tab breaks the beam of light in the photoelectric switch, a hidden 
speaker produces the sound of a horse hoof hitting the ground. 
 
 
Figure 2. Evidence relevant to the illusion of motion can be described as a 
factorial space determined by observational vantage point and rotational 
state of the zoetrope. The animation has a unique appearance in each cell of 
the space. By comparing the evidence available from different cells, children 
could collect sufficient evidence to understand how the zoetrope works. 
 
TABLE 1 
General Measures of Children’s Use of the Zoetrope 
 
 Children with Parents Children with Peers Solo 
Children 
Time at exhibit(s)    
Mean 85 42 27 
SD 59 27 30 
Use of four 
operators 
   
Spin 85% 72%   100% 
Look through 
slots 
75% 54% 50% 
Look over the 
top 
55% 59% 60% 
Use tabs 41% 32% 25% 
 
 
Figure 3. (a) Target children’s exposure to evidence about the illusion 
of motion was described as the mean number of 10-s segments in each 
interaction where children entered each cell in the factorial evidence 
space, (b) Children in adult–child groups encountered each kind of 
evidence more often than children in peer or solitary goups, and (c) were 
more likely to make comparisons between two cells in the evidence space 
within a single segment. 
 
 
Figure  4. Mean utterances of each kind for adults and children. As 
compared to children in adult–child interactions or children in peer 
interactions, parents carried most of the conversation that arose at the 
zoetrope. 
 
